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VIDEO GAMES AND NCAA ATHLETES: RESOLVING A
MODERN THREAT TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Alex Vlisides*
ABSTRACT
In 2013, two U.S. Courts of Appeals ruled that NCAA athletes
could maintain right of publicity claims against a video game maker
for use of their likeness. These decisions in favor of sympathetic
plaintiffs reveal the threat that current right of publicity doctrine
poses to First Amendment rights. The right of publicity tests applied
by lower courts conflict with both the Supreme Court precedent and
the theoretical foundations of the doctrine. This article reviews and
rejects this test, ultimately proposing a new test. This two-tiered
right of publicity test better protects the values of right of publicity
while protecting the First Amendment rights of content creators.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) would not
describe its mission as benefitting a “small number of people who get
very, very rich on the exploitation of young students.”1 The NCAA
would not describe its relationship with Electronic Arts (EA), the
maker of popular college athletics video games, as “exploitation of
player’s names and likenesses for commercial purposes.”2 It
certainly would not describe its insistence that college athletes
maintain an unpaid, amateur status as a “transparent excuse for
monopoly operations.”3 However, this is how current and former
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JD, University of Minnesota Law School; MA, University of Minnesota School of
Journalism and Mass Communication; BS, University of Wisconsin.
Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 416, In re NCAA StudentAthlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW (N.D. Cal. July 19,
2013) (quoting James Duderstadt, former President of Univ. of Mich. (June 2013)).
Id. ¶ 414 (quoting E-mail from Dan Beebe, former Comm’r of the Big Twelve (July
27, 2009)).
Id. ¶ 412 (quoting WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING
STUDENT ATHLETES 388 (1995)).
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officials of the NCAA and its member universities have described the
system.4
In In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litigation, current and former college athletes were seeking a share
of the billions of dollars in revenue that college athletics produce.5
Among the athletes’ legal claims was that their likenesses were
improperly licensed without compensation from the NCAA and
Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) to EA, thus violating their
right of publicity.6 On September 26, 2013, the athletes’ plaintiff
class reached a proposed settlement with EA and the CLC, releasing
the right of publicity claims against those defendants in exchange for
a reported $40 million.7 This settlement, and the continuing case
against the NCAA, satisfies many people’s gut-level responses to an
NCAA system that enriches large corporations and athletic
administrators while denying any compensation to the young, unpaid
athletes who sacrifice their time and sometimes health to produce the
massive revenues of college sports. The NCAA system, through
which EA acquired the license to create its video games, has been
described as “unfair,”8 “evil,”9 and even “tragic.”10 But, as United
States Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito put it, “tragic facts make
bad law.”11
The recent settlement was spurred by decisions in right of publicity
cases that have applied the right too broadly and without respect to
the interests that animate the doctrine. In Hart v. EA12 and In re
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See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1272 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2013).
Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5–6.
Steve Eder, E.A. Sports and Collegiate Licensing to Pay $40 Million to Compensate
Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/sports/nc
aafootball/ea-sports-and-collegiate-licensing-to-pay-40-million-to-compensateathletes.html?_r=0.
Michael Rosenberg, Debate Over Antiquated NCAA Goes Way Beyond Pay-For-Play,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.si.com/collegefootball/2013/09/27/jim-delany-comments-ncaa-accountability-act.
Jonathan Weiler, ‘A Brilliantly Devised, Evil System,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23,
2013, 1:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-weiler/a-brilliantlydevised-evi_b_3972337.html?utm_hp_ref=ncaa.
Tate Watkins, College Football 101: College Athletes Deserve Academic Credit for
Playing, BLEACHER REPORT, (Nov. 16, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/9436
13-college-football-101-college-athletes-deserve-academic-credit-for-playing.
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
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NCAA,13 U.S. appellate courts found that college football video
games violate the student athletes’ right of publicity. These decisions
applied the wrong doctrinal test for right of publicity, giving too
much weight to the economic rights of the athletes and too little
weight to the First Amendment rights of the speakers. The
implications of these decisions threaten a broad range of expression
previously thought to be protected by the First Amendment. The
makers of films, novels, music, and even non-fiction writing could be
subject to civil suits based on these precedents.14
In the only right of publicity case the U.S. Supreme Court has ever
decided, it announced two competing interests at stake in right of
publicity cases: the strong First Amendment rights of speakers and
the government’s interest in incentivizing individual investment by
protecting a limited intellectual property interest.15 Since the
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting decision, lower courts
have not focused on these interests, failing to protect the American
marketplace of ideas.16 Judges must make difficult decisions,
sometimes against sympathetic plaintiffs, to preserve First
Amendment rights. After examining the interests announced by the
Zacchini court in detail in Part II, this paper argues that courts should
embrace a new test for right of publicity that protects speakers while
serving the interests that the Supreme Court outlined.17
In Part II, the author performs a close reading of Zacchini,
pinpointing the interests identified by the Court. Part III examines
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, in which the Supreme
Court extended broad First Amendment protections to video games
and explained why First Amendment theory required that result.18
Part IV synthesizes the right of publicity doctrine with the
marketplace theory of the First Amendment, demonstrating the
theoretical underpinnings of the Zacchini decision. Part V overviews
the development of right of publicity, reviewing the strengths and
weaknesses of the three main tests that lower courts have adopted.
Part VI analyzes the application of one of these tests—the
Transformative Use Test— in Hart and In re NCAA and explores
how the Transformative Use Test fails to reflect the values articulated
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
See id. at 1289–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574–76 (1977).
See infra Part V.
See infra Parts II, VII.
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
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in Zacchini. Part VII proposes a two-tiered test based in part on the
commercial speech doctrine, which better identifies expression
protected against right of publicity claims by focusing on the interests
articulated in Zacchini.
II. THE LESSONS OF ZACCHINI: THE INTERESTS
IDENTIFIED BY THE SUPREME COURT FOR
PROTECTION OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. is the U.S. Supreme
Court’s only decision addressing the First Amendment limitations on
the right of publicity.19 A close reading of this case is necessary for
any examination of the doctrine for at least two reasons. First,
Zacchini presented a relatively rare factual scenario that formed very
different issues than many of the cases that have interpreted the case
and developed the right of publicity doctrine. Second, the Supreme
Court articulated in Zacchini the interests that animate the doctrine.
Right of publicity is a limited property right that can be invoked
against those engaged in expression that would otherwise be
protected by the First Amendment.20 The Zacchini court identified
the state interests that allow for the limitation on otherwise
constitutionally protected speech.21 The development of the doctrine
and the tests used to evaluate right of publicity cases, must be
analyzed with these interests at the forefront.
Hugo Zacchini was an entertainer who performed novelty shows in
which he shot himself out of a cannon into a net about 200 feet
away.22 While performing at a county fair in Ohio, Zacchini saw a
freelance reporter for a Scripps-Howard television station and asked
him not to film the performance.23 However, the reporter returned the

19.

20.
21.

22.
23.

Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of Publicity with First
Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165, 168
(2010).
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
Right of publicity is a right granted by states, either by common law or by statute, to
protect the economic value of a person’s likeness. See Thomas Phillip Boggess V,
Cause of Action for an Infringement of the Right of Publicity, in 31 CAUSES OF ACTION
2d §§ 1–2 (Thomson/West 2006). Thus, protections of right of publicity vary by
state. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 132–33 (1993). This paper analyzes the limits
on all state right of publicity laws imposed by the U.S. Constitution.
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563.
Id. at 563–64.
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next day and recorded the performance.24 A local nightly newscast
aired a fifteen second film clip which showed Zacchini’s entire act.25
Zacchini brought suit for several causes of action including
infringement on his right of publicity.26 The Ohio Supreme Court
ruled in favor of Scripps-Howard, finding that it had a First
Amendment protected right to “report in its newscasts matters of
legitimate public interest.”27 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the First Amendment did not protect Scripps-Howard’s
expression.28 The Court found the state could restrict the expression
because “[w]herever the line in particular situations is to be drawn
between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we
are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not
immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s entire act
without his consent.”29
The Court’s analysis put great weight on the fact that the broadcast
captured and reproduced Zacchini’s entire act:
The broadcast of a film of petitioner’s entire act poses a
substantial threat to the economic value of that performance.
As the Ohio court recognized, this act is the product of
petitioner’s own talents and energy, the end result of much
time, effort, and expense. Much of its economic value lies
in the ‘right of exclusive control over the publicity given to
his performance’; if the public can see the act free on
television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair.30
The Court espoused two rationales for why the First Amendment
should not protect the station’s otherwise-lawful journalistic
activity.31
First, the news station captured, at the very least, much of the
economic value of Zacchini’s act and appropriated it for its own uses.
The Court explained that Zacchini’s act was newsworthy, and
reporting, commenting and even depicting the act on the news may
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. Zacchini’s claim was based in a common law right of publicity recognized by
Ohio courts. Id.
Id. at 565 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 455
(Ohio 1976)).
Id. at 578.
Id. at 574–75.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 573–75.
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very well have been protected speech.32 However, Zacchini had
developed a fifteen-second novelty act, which people paid to see
live.33 The important distinction between reporting on the act and
showing footage of the entire act is that the latter deprives the
performer of the value that he created through developing his act.
Broadcast reports, descriptions, and pictures of the act all trade on the
likeness of Zacchini, creating content for the newscast by
appropriating his likeness. But they do not capture and distribute the
very act that Zacchini has invested time, money and effort to develop.
In other words, Zacchini did not have a right to restrict all speech
that makes use of his likeness or act, but rather only speech that
threatened to sap his economic incentive to develop his act. The
Court regarded the “reward to the owner (as) a secondary
consideration” of the right of publicity doctrine.34 The right of
publicity primarily “provides an economic incentive for him to make
the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the
public.”35
The Court’s analysis that right of publicity did not protect a
likeness holder’s reputation supports this incentive interest. If the
doctrine were designed to protect an individual’s right to control his
or her likeness, there would be no need to distinguish between the
reputational and economic effects of control. An individual’s right is
his to exercise without regard to what type of damage he values.
However, the doctrine “focus[es] on the right of the individual to reap
the reward of his endeavors and [has] little to do with protecting
feelings or reputation.”36 Although right of publicity is an action
brought by individuals, the state’s interest is in protecting economic
incentives.37 The Zacchini court defined it as a limited right granted
to support investment in expression of public value.38
The Court’s pronouncement that the right of publicity was not a
reputational right has another important implication. In right of
publicity cases, claimants do not object to the fact of publication, but

32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 578. “If under this standard respondent had merely reported that petitioner was
performing at the fair and described or commented on his act, with or without
showing his picture on television, we would have a very different case.” Id. at 569.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 577 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
Id. at 576.
Id. at 573.
Id.
Id.
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rather that they are not compensated.39 The public, and therefore the
marketplace of ideas, will not “be deprived of the benefit of
petitioner’s performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is
appropriately recognized.”40 In other words, the public interest is in
promoting valuable expression, and this is served by encouraging
those like Zacchini to develop and broadcast their talents. This is the
essence of the right of publicity. Much has been made of the Court’s
analogy of right of publicity to more traditional intellectual
property.41 But the Court emphasized that the “economic philosophy
behind” protecting the rights “is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare.”42 Protection of the right of publicity is largely a means to
the end of a richer marketplace of ideas by encouraging people to
invest in their expression. The right of publicity prevails where the
public interest in encouraging investment by the likeness holder
outweighs the speaker’s First Amendment interests.
Zacchini has long stood as a somewhat inscrutable explanation of
the First Amendment bounds on the right of publicity.43 But by
identifying the interests to be served, lower courts can craft a doctrine
in line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning. Foremost, the right of
publicity is a means to promote investment in expression. The
marketplace of ideas is protected by the tailored limitations on
otherwise protected speech because the right of publicity promotes
the development of expression that is valuable to the public. This is
the value that should underlie all right of publicity analyses.
III. THE LESSONS OF BROWN: VIDEO GAMES AS CORE
PROTECTED SPEECH AND THE DANGERS OF
EVALUATING EXPRESSIVE VALUE
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Supreme Court
confronted a state law restricting violent video games and declared
that video games are, from a First Amendment perspective,
indistinguishable from books, plays, movies, and other classically

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 578.
Id.
See, e.g., 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 24:4
(2015).
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954)).
See Barbara A. Burnett, The Property Right of Publicity and the First Amendment:
Popular Culture and the Commercial Persona, 3 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 171, 192 (1990).
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protected forms of expression.44 Like these mediums, video games
“communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many
familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and
music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the
player’s interaction with the virtual world).”45 “That,” the Court
concluded, “suffices to confer First Amendment protection.”46
Like these other forms of expression, video games are protected
even when not communicating core political or ideological speech. 47
The Court has “long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish
politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try.”48 Moreover, they
may be indistinguishable, as “[w]hat is one man’s amusement,
teaches another’s doctrine.”49 The preservation of the marketplace of
ideas requires free expression, and the Court unequivocally includes
video games in this protection. “Under our Constitution, ‘esthetic
and moral judgments about art and literature . . . are for the individual
to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or
approval of a majority.’”50
Hart and In re NCAA, like Zacchini, dealt with the restriction of
expression that is given the broadest protection under the First
Amendment.51 In Brown, the nation’s highest court reaffirmed a deep
distrust of value judgments by courts regarding core protected
speech.52 The Court made clear that judicial analysis of what
protected speech has more or less societal value is both “difficult”
and “dangerous.”53 The right of publicity limits First Amendment
protected speech. Analysis of the scope of this right must
acknowledge the fundamental rights at stake and recognize the
dangers of making value assessments regarding core protected
speech.
Thus, Brown provides two foundational principles necessary for
analyzing a case involving the content of a video game. First, this
content is creative expression like art or literature and must be given
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 259 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)).
See generally Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing the elements of
expression); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) (analyzing courts’
application of a balancing test with regard to a claimed right of publicity).
See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2731 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2011)).
Id. at 2733.
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the highest First Amendment scrutiny. Second, courts should not
base decisions on an evaluation of the subjective value of a creative
expression.
IV. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS AND RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, including
Zacchini and Brown, has long recognized the Constitution’s role in
guarding speech rights to protect the marketplace of ideas. 54 The
intellectual roots of marketplace theory are often attributed to two
influential thinkers, John Milton and John Stuart Mill. John Milton
wrote in the seventeenth century of the metaphorical conflict between
truth and falsehood. In many ways, marketplace theory can be
defined by Milton’s question: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple;
who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open
encounter[?]”55 In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill refined
the theory with a focus on the assumptions that underlie any attempt
to silence opinion: that the speech of the silencer is more valuable
than the speech of those being silenced.56 Mill argued that the
constant contradictions of the marketplace of ideas were the only way
to find truth.57 He wrote, “Complete liberty of contradicting and
disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in
assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a
being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being
right.”58
In American jurisprudence, the emergence of this marketplace
theory of the First Amendment is often traced to Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes’ forceful dissent in Abrams v. United States. “[T]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of
our Constitution.”59 Though the theory has been challenged and

54.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(examining the relationship between privileged speech rights and the right to
broadcast).
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF
UNLICENC’D PRINTING 35 (London, W. Johnston 1644).
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1975)
(1859).
Id.
Id. at 20.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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debated by modern scholars,60 it retains significant influence among
American courts.61 Even critics of the theory recognize that it
remains perhaps the most powerful theory of the First Amendment in
American jurisprudence.62 As the modern Supreme Court stated in
Knox v. Service Employees International Union, “The First
Amendment creates ‘an open marketplace’ in which differing ideas . .
. can compete freely for public acceptance without improper
government interference.”63
The Court has understood this theory not only to protect an
individual’s right to speak, but as a collective imperative to safeguard
a free marketplace of ideas. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, the
Court declared, “The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom
to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and
thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common quest for
truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”64 Marketplace theory
entails both an individual’s ability to participate in the marketplace
and the societal value of the market’s preservation.65
Marketplace theory informs the Zacchini court’s attempts to
reconcile the news station’s speech rights with Zacchini’s economic
rights. The news station’s First Amendment right to disseminate
information implicates core protected speech.66
A sprawling,
productive marketplace of ideas requires broad freedom to engage in
such speech.67 However, the government’s interest in protecting
Zacchini’s likeness also implicates First Amendment values. As
explained by the Court in Brown, entertainment such as Zacchini’s
act has great value in the marketplace.68 After all, “one man’s
amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”69 And as explained by the
Court in Zacchini, the public’s ability to have access to expression
that requires personal investment to develop, such as Zacchini’s act,
depends on preservation of the economic incentives promoting such
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

68.
69.

See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1, 1 (1984).
See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 2:21.
Id. § 2:15
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012) (quoting
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)).
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984).
Id.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (recognizing “a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”).
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
Id. (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
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investment.70 Although Zacchini’s personal right of publicity claim
is based on a property right, not a speech right, the foundation of the
right of publicity is the public interest in protecting the marketplace
of ideas. The right of publicity is a means to this end.
V. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TESTS
Since Zacchini, courts have taken many approaches to evaluate the
constitutionally permissible scope of the right of publicity. The Third
Circuit in Hart and the Ninth Circuit in In re NCAA discussed three
tests: the Predominant Use Test, the Rogers Test, and the
Transformative Use Test.71 The Predominant Use Test and the
Rogers Test focus on the distinction between commercial and
expressive uses of a person’s likeness.72 Although they have different
analyses, the tests seek to determine whether the likeness is being
appropriated for commercial use, which may be restricted by a right
of publicity claim, or expressive use, which is privileged against such
claims.73 The Transformative Use Test, applied in Hart and In re
NCAA, takes the commercial or expressive nature of the use into
account, but does not make this distinction dispositive.74 Instead, the
test borrows a concept from copyright law, asking whether the
likeness is just one of the “raw materials” of the expression or “the
very sum and substance of the work.”75 Each of these tests, upon a
careful reading, is inconsistent with the interests that animate the
right of publicity doctrine as the U.S. Supreme Court defined it in
Zacchini.
A. Predominant Use Test
The Predominant Use Test, as announced in Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, focuses on whether the use of a likeness is commercial

70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

75.

Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 (3d Cir. 2013); Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1273
(9th Cir. 2013).
See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373.
See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001) (“We
ask . . . whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it
has become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s
likeness.”).
Id.
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or expressive.76 The Supreme Court of Missouri wrote that “the
threshold legal question [is] whether the use of a person’s name and
identity is ‘expressive,’ in which case it is fully protected, or
‘commercial,’ in which case it is generally not protected.”77 This
means that use of a likeness in “news, entertainment, and creative
works for the purpose of communicating information or expressive
ideas” is highly protected while use in “advertising goods or services
or . . . merchandise, is rarely protected.”78
The court argued that this Predominant Use Test would best
address the issues arising where speech has both expressive and
commercial elements.79 Courts applying this test are asked to
determine which type of use, expressive or commercial,
predominates.
A product “that predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual’s identity” is not protected, while
a product that predominantly “make[s] an expressive comment on or
about a celebrity,” is protected.80
Although the distinction between commercial and non-commercial
use is a useful one, the court provided little guidance as to how to
define which use predominates. Beyond this, the court never
attempted to reconcile its pronouncement that expressive use, such as
a newscast, is protected with the Zacchini decision, which found that
a newscast was not protected.81 The court’s narrow focus on the
commercial/expression distinction did not allow for a full
consideration of the interests identified in Zacchini, including the
incentive interest.82 In addition, it failed to provide the analytical
tools for other courts to make the distinction. Courts are left,
essentially, to weigh the expressive value provided by the use, which
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

82.

TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373–74.
Id. at 373.
Id.
Id. at 374.
Id.
See id. at 373; Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569–79 (1977)
(holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not protect a newscast that
displayed a performer’s entire act, as opposed to a newscast that merely reported he
was performing or described the act). In fact, one treatise described the Missouri
Supreme Court as “[e]ssentially holding that the Supreme Court did not really mean
what it said.” MARK LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §
17:21, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2015).
See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373; see also Jordon M. Blake, No Doubt About
It—You’ve Got to Have Hart: Simulation Video Games may Redefine the Balance
Between and Among the Right of Publicity, the First Amendment, and Copyright Law,
19 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 42 (2013) (“The court discussed Zacchini, observing
that its holding is very narrow and should only be applied in situations analogous to
having one’s entire act appropriated.”).
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Justice Scalia would likely call a “difficult” and “dangerous”
standard on which to rely to discern what speech the Constitution
protects.83 Few federal courts have endorsed the Predominate Use
Test.84
B. Rogers Test
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit introduced what later
courts refer to as the Rogers Test.85 The claim centered on a celebrity
duo, Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, whose likenesses Rogers
claimed had been appropriated by “the use of the title ‘Ginger and
Fred’ for a fictional movie that only obliquely relate[d] to Rogers and
Astaire.”86 The Rogers Test, like the Predominant Use Test, focuses
mainly on the commercial/expressive distinction.
The court recognized that in reference to celebrities, “prominence
invites creative comment.”87 Because of the expressive value of such
comment, the court crafted a narrow test.88 The Rogers Test would
protect expression from right of publicity claims unless the likeness
was “wholly unrelated” to the expression or was “simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”89 It asks
whether the appropriation of the likeness is a genuine part of the
expressive content or a commercial attempt to add value to an
existing expression through use of the likeness.90 The court found
that the title was related to the content of the movie and was not a
disguised advertisement, and thus was protected by the First
Amendment.91

83.
84.

85.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2013) (rejecting the
Predominant Use test and adopting the Transformative Use Test); LEE, supra note 81
(stating that a Missouri federal court disregarded TCI Cablevision and applied a
balancing test instead).
See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); see also, e.g., Brown v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2013) (referencing the Second Circuit’s
creation of the Rogers Test); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 451–52 (6th Cir.
2003) (applying the Rogers Test).
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996.
Id. at 1004 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal.
1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring)).
See id. at 999, 1004–05.
Id. at 1004 (first quoting Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 457 n.6; then quoting Frosch v.
Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1980)).
See id. at 1004–05.
Id.
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The court limited the analysis to the facts at issue, a celebrity’s
likeness being invoked in a title. It made no attempt to square the
decision with Zacchini or examine how it would be applied in other
fact patterns. Although the test is perhaps sufficient to analyze this
narrow fact pattern, it became problematic as later courts applied it in
other cases.
The Sixth Circuit applied the Rogers Test in Parks v. LaFace
Records.92 Civil rights leader Rosa Parks brought an action against
rap group Outkast for appropriation of her likeness in the song Rosa
Parks.93 Though the song was not about Parks or the civil rights
movement, the song advised competing rappers and MCs to “move to
the back of the bus.”94 Outkast claimed that Rosa Parks’ name is a
metaphor for the action that she made famous: refusing to “move to
the back of the bus.”95
The court applied the Rogers Test and concluded, “in the context of
the lyrics . . . the phrase [‘move to the back of the bus’] has
absolutely nothing to do with Rosa Parks.”96 Simply, the court did
not believe that there was an artistic motivation for naming the song
Rosa Parks, but instead found it was chosen to “enhance[] the song’s
potential sale to the consuming public.”97 The court denied that “the
symbol of Rosa Parks, a symbol of ‘freedom, humanity, dignity, and
strength,’ is artistically related to the content of a song that appears to
be diametrically opposed to those qualities.”98 In other words, the
First Amendment did not protect this speech because the court either
does not understand or does not approve of the metaphor. The court
even helpfully suggested that a different title, “Back of the Bus, for

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

97.
98.

329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 441.
Id. at 442–43 (quoting OUTKAST, Rosa Parks, on AQUEMINI (LaFace Records 1998)).
Id. at 452.
Id. at 452 (emphasis omitted). The name is used as short hand for a concept, or
concepts, as a variety of names are. Famous names become part of language, and
some people must be the first to use the metaphor. Names like Einstein or
Shakespeare even become so associated with a definition that they are commonly
invoked sarcastically to mean the opposite of their namesake’s qualities. The court’s
reasoning would conclude that any song not about theoretical physics or English
literature could violate these famous individual’s right of publicity.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 456. The Court dismisses Outkast’s invocation of Parks, concluding that
“[w]hile Defendants’ lyrics contain profanity and a great deal of ‘explicit’ language . .
. they contain absolutely nothing that could conceivably, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered, explicitly or implicitly, a reference to courage, to
sacrifice, to the civil rights movement or to any other quality with which Rosa Parks is
identified.” Id. at 453.
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example,” would better communicate the artist’s message.99 This
type of evaluation flies in the face of the First Amendment truism that
judges should not make “esthetic and moral judgments about art and
literature.”100
This disturbing judicial scrutiny applied to artistic choices is a
product of the failures of the Rogers Test. The test fails to place the
incentive interest at the center of analysis. It is not clear how
Outkast’s use of Parks’ name would alter the economic incentives of
Parks or those similar to her. Zacchini firmly established that the
right of publicity is not a reputational right.101 If Parks believed the
song defamed, slandered, or otherwise damaged her reputation, other
causes of action could be pursued. The right of publicity protects
against appropriation to promote individual investment, not against
artistic invocation of a famous name for a purpose the likeness holder
happens to disagree with.
C. Transformative Use Test
The Transformative Use Test was introduced in Comedy III
Productions, Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc.102 The estates of the famous
comedy trio The Three Stooges brought an action against an artist
who produced T-shirts featuring charcoal drawings of The Three
Stooges.103 The parties stipulated that the shirts did not “constitute an
advertisement, endorsement, or sponsorship of any product,” but the
plaintiffs claimed that the First Amendment nonetheless did not
protect the shirts against the right of a publicity claim.104
The California Supreme Court applied what later courts would call
the Transformative Use Test, which analogizes right of publicity to
copyright law, borrowing part of the Fair Use Doctrine.105 The test
asks courts to determine whether the challenged work has “so
transformed [the likeness] that it has become primarily the
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”106
This is determined by evaluating “whether the celebrity likeness is
one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is
99. Id. at 453.
100. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting United States
v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)).
101. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
102. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001).
103. Id. at 800–01.
104. Id. at 801.
105. Id. at 808.
106. Id. at 809.
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synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is
the very sum and substance of the work in question.”107
The California Supreme Court identified many interests that
underlie right of publicity. The court spent significant time
examining the First Amendment interests at stake and recognized the
important expression that the use of famous likenesses can
It acknowledged that the theory of the First
contribute.108
Amendment requires protections “‘to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas’ and to repel efforts to limit ‘uninhibited, robust
and wide-open’ debate on public issues.’”109
The court reasoned that “when a work contains significant
transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First
Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the
economic interest protected by the right of publicity.”110 The court
described the Transformative Use Test as comporting with many of
the values established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Zacchini and
Brown. Because “courts are not to be concerned with the quality of
the artistic contribution,”111 the test’s inquiry is “more quantitative
than qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the
creative elements predominate in the work.”112 This attempt to avoid
judicial value judgments of expressive content is laudable and
necessary to comport with Brown.
The court’s application of the Transformative Use Test had many
strengths. It identified the incentive interest for right of publicity
established by Zacchini.113 It explicated the strong First Amendment
protections even as applied to “nontraditional media of
expression.”114
It recognized the dangers of judicial value
assessments of expression and attempted to create a framework that
avoids such assessments.115
One major weakness of the Transformative Use Test is that it does
not provide a clear framework for making the “‘commonsense’

107. Id.
108. Id. at 802–04.
109. Id. at 803 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal.
1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring)).
110. Id. at 808.
111. Id. at 809.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 808 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
114. Id. at 804.
115. Id. at 809 (“[C]ourts are not to be concerned with the quality of the artistic
contribution . . . .”).
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distinction”116 between commercial and noncommercial speech.
Although some of the analysis seems to assume that commercial
speech would be due lesser protection,117 the California Supreme
Court never made clear how the operation of the test achieves that
end. The failure to make this distinction makes it more difficult to
identify expression the First Amendment protects from right of
publicity claims, because the Supreme Court has found that the
protections due noncommercial speech are different, and greater, than
commercial speech.118
A second major weakness is that although the Comedy III Products
court identified the important interests of the doctrine, the test fails to
precisely focus on them. As to the scope of protection, the California
Supreme Court found that the right of publicity should protect against
“production of conventional, more or less fungible, images of the
celebrity.”119 The idea of a “more or less fungible” use of a likeness
in many ways cuts to the core of questions about transformative
use.120 The court was asking, Did the expression appropriate the
likeness in a way that could more or less have been made by someone
else? Or did the expression require creative investment that
transformed it into a valuable contribution in the marketplace of
ideas?121 These questions are paramount. In evaluating close calls
and tough factual scenarios, it is indispensable to understand the
values fundamental to these questions. However, courts applying the
Transformative Use Test have focused on the transformative nature
of the use as an end in itself.122 The transformative nature of
expression is just a proxy, and not the only one, for whether the
public will be deprived of a creative contribution if the expression is
restricted. The central question is, Was the use transformative,
thereby making it a distinct contribution to the marketplace of
ideas?123

116. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980)
(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
117. See Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 803.
118. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63 (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456).
119. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 808.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 809.
122. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
Transformative Use Test maintains a singular focus on whether the work sufficiently
transforms the celebrity’s identity or likeness . . . .”).
123. See Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 811 (explaining how Andy Warhol’s
“distortion and . . . careful manipulation of context” in his silkscreens of celebrities
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The weaknesses of this test become clearer when applied in later
cases. The Hart and In re NCAA cases demonstrate how a generally
well-constructed test that recognizes the interests of the doctrine can
lead to unpredictable and dangerous conclusions because of a failure
to focus precisely and consistently on the proper values.124
VI. THE TRANSFORMATIVE USE TEST IN HART AND IN RE
NCAA
Hart and In re NCAA were right of publicity cases that presented
“materially identical” legal challenges, according to the Ninth
Circuit.125 The principal plaintiffs in the cases were former Rutgers
University quarterback Ryan Hart in Hart and former Nebraska
University quarterback Samuel Keller in In re NCAA.126 Both were
featured in EA’s football video game series NCAA Football.127 In
these cases, the Third and Ninth Circuits applied the Transformative
Use Test, finding that the First Amendment did not, as a matter of
law, protect defendant EA’s expression.128 These two cases created
the legal environment in which EA settled with the plaintiff class of
former NCAA athletes for a reported $40 million.129 Though this
case has settled, the larger question remains: when can content
creators use a person’s likeness without compensation? Evaluating
the analysis from these two cases reveals that the outcomes in Hart
and In re NCAA are unacceptable in two ways. First, the decisions
failed to properly identify and apply the interests identified by the
Supreme Court in Zacchini. Second, the muddled analysis, and
disagreement amongst the judges in the same circuits, left artists and
content creators with little guidance as to when the First Amendment
protects their work from a right of publicity suit. As explored further
below, this lack of clarity is damaging to First Amendment
expression and counter to the values of the right of publicity doctrine.
In Hart, the Third Circuit wrote that “the Transformative Use Test
maintains a singular focus on whether the work sufficiently

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

created transformative expressions that surpassed a mere reproduction of celebrity
portraits).
See Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 2013).
In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1278 (citing Hart, 717 F.3d. at 141); see also Hart, 717 F.3d
at 163 n.28 (“Keller is simply [Hart] incarnated in California.”).
Hart, 717 F.3d at 145; In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1271.
Hart, 717 F.3d at 146; In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1271.
Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1276, 1284.
Eder, supra note 7.
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transforms the celebrity’s identity or likeness.”130 Right of publicity
tests, including the Transformative Use Test, are a means to the end
of balancing the property interests and speech interests at stake. By
creating a “singular focus” on transformative use,131 the Hart and In
re NCAA courts failed to ask the deeper and more important question:
Does restricting the expression serve to incentivize likeness holders
without denying creative and unique speech access to the
marketplace of ideas? Transformative use is one way of answering
this question, but “singular focus” on the transformative nature of use
leads to a predictable conclusion: a failure to serve the interests of the
doctrine.
The courts’ analyses reveal the consequences of this problematic
focus. The Hart court concluded that the video game’s use of Hart’s
likeness was not transformative for several reasons. First, the game
strived for realism both in Hart’s appearance and in the situations in
which he appears. In other words, “[t]he digital Ryan Hart does what
the actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college
football.”132 In addition, the games will appeal to the fans of a
player’s university, implying that the realism is the value of the
expression.133 The In re NCAA court analogized to Comedy III
Products, reasoning that like the drawings in that case, making the
video games required “undeniable skill” but that skill is “manifestly
subordinated to the overall goal of creating literal, conventional
depictions” of Keller.134 Addressing the argument that the likeness is
but a small part of a creative and transformative whole, the court
declared that “the Transformative Use Test invariably look[s] to how
the celebrity’s identity is used.”135
Creative elements are
transformative only to the extent that they affect the depiction of a
celebrity likeness.
The courts’ analyses that the use was not transformative are
problematic in a few ways. The dissents in each case identified one
issue by pointing out the danger of the majorities’ reasoning applied
more broadly. The dissent in In re NCAA concluded that “[t]he
130. Hart, 717 F.3d at 163 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 166. The Ninth Circuit applied the same reasoning. See In re NCAA, 724 F.3d
at 1279 (“NCAA Football realistically portrays college football players in the context
of college football games . . . .”).
133. Hart, 717 F.3d at 168.
134. In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1278 (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,
21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001)).
135. Hart, 717 F.3d at 169.
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logical consequence of the majority view is that all realistic
depictions of actual persons, no matter how incidental, are protected
by a state law right of publicity regardless of the creative context.” 136
Because, under Brown, video games receive the same First
Amendment protection as, for instance, books or film, the majority
analysis would restrict many expressive works traditionally thought
to be protected by the First Amendment.137
Another issue is the reliability of the analysis to produce
predictable results. Where speakers would be likely to self-censor
due to concerns that their speech would be “in or near the uncertain
reach of” a law, “[t]he Constitution gives significant protection from
overbroad laws that chill speech.”138 The First Amendment requires
that speakers know when their speech is prohibited.139 Although this
interest may be slightly lessened in the civil area, it is important
nonetheless. It is important to note that each of these cases contained
strong dissents, not only finding that EA’s expression should be
protected, but also explaining the dangers of the majorities’
reasoning.140 This vast disparity between judges applying the same
test speaks to the lack of clarity that the Transformative Use Test
provides.
Another aspect of the Hart majority opinion demonstrated the
unpredictable results of Transformative Use Test analysis. In
addition to the animated depiction of Hart featured in NCAA Football
2006, a picture of Hart was used in an introductory montage in NCAA
136. In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1290 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (“This logic jeopardizes the creative use of historic figures in motion pictures,
books, and sound recordings. Absent the use of actual footage, the motion picture
Forrest Gump might as well be a box of chocolates. Without its historical characters,
Midnight in Paris would be reduced to a pedestrian domestic squabble. The
majority’s holding that creative use of realistic images and personas does not satisfy
the Transformative Use Test cannot be reconciled with the many cases affording such
works First Amendment protection.”).
138. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).
139. See Kevin Francis O’Neill, A First Amendment Compass: Navigating the Speech
Clause with a Five-Step Analytical Framework, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 223, 278–82
(2000).
140. See In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[A]n individual college
athlete’s right of publicity is extraordinarily circumscribed and, in practical reality,
nonexistent.”); Hart, 717 F.3d at 175–76 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (“I sympathize with
the position of Hart and other similarly situated college football players, and
understand why they feel it is fair to share in the significant profits produced by
including their avatar likenesses into EA’s commercially successful video game
franchise. I nonetheless remain convinced that the creative components of NCAA
Football contain sufficient expressive transformation to merit First Amendment
protection.”).
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Football 2009.141 However, unlike the depiction in the video game,
the court found that “the context of [Hart’s] photograph—the
montage—imbues the image with additional meaning beyond simply
being a representation of the player.”142
The court almost
inexplicably concluded that an animation of Hart, drawn and
animated by designers, placed into an interactive, meticulously
designed virtual world, is a “literal” depiction of Hart and thus
unworthy of First Amendment protection, while a photograph of
Hart, shown in a montage with other football players, had been
transformed to be predominately the creative expression of its
designers.143 This reveals a major problem with the majority’s
reasoning. The test is not focused enough to provide consistent
application.
When applied to a more traditional form of expression, for
instance, a documentary, the First Amendment issues with this
application may become clearer. The Hart majority insisted that the
test would preserve “already-existing First Amendment protections”
for “documentaries . . . and other expressive works depicting real-life
figures.”144 One can certainly imagine a documentary, rather than a
video game, about college football featuring depictions of Hart. The
documentary would, of course, strive for realism, and would likely
appeal to college football fans. It would depict Hart participating in
the very activity for which he gained prominence: playing football for
Rutgers. The depictions of Hart would be literal depictions, perhaps
the popular documentary style of a camera panning across an image
as a voiceover makes description or commentary. It is simply not
clear why any of these uses are more transformative than the video
game at issue in Hart. The court’s explanation of the Transformative
Use Test implies and explicitly identifies traditional expressive works
that would be protected,145 but the logical operation of the test reveals

141. Hart, 717 F.3d at 176 n.9.
142. Id. at 170 (citing ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003)).
143. Id. (“We therefore hold that NCAA Football 2004, 2005, and 2006 games at issue in
this case do not sufficiently transform [Hart’s] identity to escape the right of publicity
claim . . . . [W]e do hold that the only apparent use of [Hart’s] likeness in NCAA
Football 2009 (the photograph) is protected by the First Amendment . . . .”). But see
id. at 170 n.47 (“In finding that NCAA Football failed to satisfy the Transformative
Use Test, we do not hold that the game loses First Amendment protection. We merely
hold that the interest protected by the right of publicity in this case outweighs the
Constitutional shield.”).
144. Id. at 165 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 173).
145. See id.
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little distinction between those works and the video game the court
found to be outside the scope of First Amendment protection.
Such vexing and amorphous analysis is among the many reasons
that the Transformative Use Test is unacceptable. Despite the
Supreme Court’s deep reservations about judicial decisions on the
expressive value of an expressive work,146 this is ultimately what the
Transformative Use Test leads to. As the Hart court ironically
pointed out in reference to the Predominant Use Test, where courts
are asked “to analyze select elements of a work to determine how
much they contribute to the entire work’s expressiveness,” the result
is “subjective at best, [and] arbitrary at worst.”147 However, the
court’s analysis asked whether “imitative” or “creative” elements
predominate a work, requiring, as the court pointed out about the
Predominant Use Test, a value-laden analysis of the degree of
expressiveness.148 The intuition of a judge about the creative value of
protected speech should never be the line between protected and
unprotected speech: between that which will reach and that which
will be restricted from the marketplace of ideas.
VII. A PROPOSAL: A TWO-TIERED TEST
A fundamental complication within right of publicity doctrine is
that there are two different problems to be confronted. The tests
examined above generally failed to parse these two issues. The
Predominant Use Test and Rogers Test largely focused on how to
differentiate commercial and expressive content.149
The
Transformative Use Test focused on how to determine whether the
use was sufficiently expressive to justify its use of a person’s
likeness.150 The problem, then, is that these tests attempt to separate

146. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
147. Hart, 717 F.3d at 154.
148. Id. at 159 (“The inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than qualitative, asking
whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate in the work.”
(quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal.
2001))).
149. Id. at 154 (“If a product . . . exploits the commercial value of an individual’s identity,
that product should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be protected by the
First Amendment, even if there is some ‘expressive’ content in it that might qualify as
‘speech’ in other circumstances.” (quoting Doe v. TCI Television, 110 S.W.3d 363,
374 (Mo. 2003))).
150. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 809 (“Another way of stating the inquiry is
whether the celebrity likeness is one of ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is
synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and
substance of the work in question. We ask, in other words, whether a product
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commercial from non-commercial speech, while balancing First
Amendment interests of the speaker and property interests of the
likeness holder. As that sentence perhaps demonstrates, this
approach is destined to result in muddled analysis that does not
squarely confront the issues.
A two-tiered approach to the right of publicity simplifies the
analysis by separating the issues.
First, is the expression
commercial? If so, the appropriation is likely not protected by the
First Amendment.151 If the expression is noncommercial, then a
balancing test of the interests identified in Zacchini should be
applied.152 The test should balance the degree to which protection of
the right of publicity will protect the economic incentive of the
claimant to develop his skill against the degree to which the public
will be deprived of the expression that is at issue.153
A. Step One: Commercial Expression
The Supreme Court has long recognized an intermediate level of
protection for commercial speech.154 There are several reasons for
this. First, the “truth of commercial speech . . . may be more easily
verifiable by its disseminator” because the speaker “presumably
knows more . . . than anyone else,” “about a specific product or
service that he himself provides.”155 Additionally, commercial
speech does not necessarily operate like other speech in the
marketplace of ideas. Generally, commerce transactions are brief and
episodic. Consumers, who must make short-term decisions on
products and service with limited information, may not have time for

151.

152.

153.
154.
155.

containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”).
Because this paper has not carefully examined analysis applied to commercial
expression, it will not propose a test for such cases. Although some have argued that
commercial appropriation of a likeness is due no First Amendment protection, this is a
topic for further research. See, e.g., Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141,
147 (D.D.C. 1995).
Hart, 717 F.3d at 152–53 (“In the wake of Zacchini, courts began applying a
balancing inquiry to resolve cases where a right of publicity claim collided with First
Amendment protections. While early cases approached the analysis from an ad hoc
perspective, courts eventually began developing standardized balancing frameworks.”
(citation omitted)).
See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575–76 (1977).
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Va. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976).
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the “sifting and winnowing” of ideas to take place. 156 As Justice
Stevens wrote, “[t]he evils of false commercial speech, which may
have an immediate harmful impact on commercial transactions,”
justify greater regulation.157 And finally, commercial speech is less
likely to be “chilled” because of the strong economic incentives of
the speakers.158 For these same reasons, it is imperative to make this
distinction in right of publicity cases.
Although courts in right of publicity cases have generally
recognized that commercial expression is deserving of less First
Amendment protection, they have not defined or evaluated
commercial expression consistently. To give clarity and consistency
to the test, the initial step in right of publicity analysis should be a
determination of whether the expression is commercial.
In Dryer v. National Football League, former professional football
players sought compensation for use of their likenesses in highlight
films.159 On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the federal
district court declared that the “threshold inquiry [was] whether the
films [were] . . . expressive works entitled to the highest protection
under the First Amendment, or commercial speech entitled to less
protection.”160 The court acknowledged that defining commercial
speech with precision had challenged courts, and that the U.S.
Supreme Court “commented on ‘the difficulty of drawing bright lines
that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.’”161
However, the court applied the test designed by the Eighth Circuit in
Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp.,162 which was derived from the
factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp.163
The three-part Porous Media Corp. test concludes that expression
is commercial where:
1. It is an advertisement;
2. It refers to a specific product or service; and

156. THEODORE HERFURTH, SIFTING AND WINNOWING (1948), reprinted in ACADEMIC
FREEDOM ON TRIAL 58, 59 (W. Lee Hansen ed., 1998).
157. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
158. Va. Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
159. Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1115 (D. Minn. 2010).
160. Id. at 1116.
161. Id. at 1117 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419
(1993)).
162. 173 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 1999).
163. 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).
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3. The speaker has an economic motivation.164
The court applied this analysis, ruling that a reasonable fact finder
could find that the films were commercial speech, akin to
infomercials for the product of NFL football.165 Thus, the First
Amendment did not necessarily protect against the right of publicity
claims.
Though this test has similar difficulty drawing bright lines that
other commercial speech tests have,166 it gives courts a sound
framework, based on Supreme Court precedent, to evaluate
commercial speech. Importantly, this analysis also excludes other
considerations and values for right of publicity analysis; at this stage
of analysis, a court need only evaluate the commercial nature of the
speech. This separation provides greater transparency and clarity in
courts’ reasoning. This has the potential to lead not only to better
reasoned decisions, but also more predictability for parties.
B. Step Two: Protection of Expressive Speech
If a court finds the expression to be noncommercial, it is due full
First Amendment protection. Courts should then apply a balancing
test of the interests identified in Zacchini.167 This would balance the
degree to which protection of the right of publicity will protect the
economic incentive of the claimant to develop their skill against the
degree to which the public will be deprived of the expression that is
at issue.168
In evaluating these considerations, courts would be wise to borrow
many of the considerations developed by courts applying the existing
tests. For instance, the degree to which the likeness is transformed
will be very instructive in evaluating the degree to which the public
would be deprived of the expression. However, this differs from an
application of the Transformative Use Test for a few reasons.169
First, transformative use is just one of the ways that courts may
evaluate this consideration. A court could inquire into the degree of
164. Dryer, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (citing Porous Media Corp., 173 F.3d at 1120). The
court acknowledges the limitations of the test including that the “Eighth Circuit itself
stressed that ‘commercial speech need not originate solely from economic motives.’”
Id. (quoting Porous Media Corp., 173 F.3d at 1121).
165. Id. at 1121.
166. Id. at 1117 (quoting Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 419).
167. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577–78 (1977).
168. Id. at 576.
169. See infra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
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skill necessary to create the expression, giving greater weight to the
type of expression that only a few members of society have the
ability to contribute. Second, the evaluation of the use’s
transformative nature is clearly defined as a means, not an end.
Rather than courts broadly concluding that “when a work contains
significant transformative elements, it is . . . especially worthy of
First Amendment protection,”170 the analysis is explicitly defined by
the interests it serves. The transformative nature of the use
necessitates greater protection because it is more likely to make a
unique contribution to the marketplace of ideas, whereas a simple
reproduction would be “more or less fungible.”171 Importantly, the
test asks courts to evaluate whether the public will have access to the
protected expression, not the value of the protected expression.
As applied to Hart and In re NCAA, this test simplifies the
analysis and ultimately brings about a different conclusion than that
of the majorities in those cases. As to the first consideration, it is
highly dubious that Keller’s use as one among thousands of avatars
reduced his incentive to develop his football skill and public
profile.172 In addition, there is little to suggest that the appropriation
of Keller’s likeness would decrease the public’s interest in watching
him play football. In other words, the video game does not serve as a
replacement for watching live football, but rather contributes another
aspect of an interest in college football. Those who “play as” the
football players in the NCAA Football videogame are at least as
likely to become more attached to their favorite teams and players
and have a greater incentive to watch them play. Zacchini
convincingly argued that the filming of his performance could
plausibly replace audiences paying to attend, thus threatening the
economic value of his show.173 No such showing was made in Hart
or In re NCAA, likely because the video game does not serve as an
analogous threat to replace the economic value of players’
performances. This does not mean that Keller’s likeness was not

170. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
171. Id.
172. See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
The In re NCAA dissent also expounds upon the truly minor contribution of Keller’s
likeness to the game. Id. at 1288. Keller and Hart were talented players but known
mostly among fans of their colleges. The dissent points out that it is exceedingly
unclear what value, if any, Keller’s individual likeness contributed to the game. Id.
Additionally, “one could play NCAA Football thousands of times without ever
encountering a particular avatar.” Id.
173. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
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appropriated. It was. However, when balancing interests, the
incentive interest identified by the Supreme Court is quite weak in
this case.
The question, then, is whether the First Amendment concerns
outweigh this small, but present, interest. This hinges on the degree
to which the public will be denied the First Amendment protected
speech. The Hart court noted the interactivity and the alterability of
the avatar as somewhat transformative elements, though ultimately
insufficient.174 Additionally, the scope of the game’s virtual world
makes the game a technical accomplishment. EA is likely one of the
few speakers with the ability to create this interactive, virtual space.
Balancing this against the slight incentive interest at stake, a court
applying the two-tiered test would likely find EA’s expression to be
protected by the First Amendment.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The current right of publicity tests are inadequate to contend with
the fundamental issues at stake in such cases. These tests must be
improved by a focus on two issues. First, commercial and noncommercial speech are due different levels of constitutional
protection. To properly make this important distinction, courts
should consider this question as a separate analytical step. The
Supreme Court has discussed the elements important to this analysis.
Based on this discussion, several circuits have adopted a three-part
test defining commercial speech.175 Although this test has been
challenged and is subject to limitations, it provides an important
starting point for courts to apply a consistent and methodologically
clear analysis identifying commercial speech. Courts and scholars
will continue to debate the best way to make the commercial versus
noncommercial distinction. For the purposes of right of publicity
analysis, it is imperative to apply an initial test to separate out core
First Amendment protected speech.
Second, a direct focus on the interests identified in Zacchini would
protect core First Amendment speech and support the values
underlying the right of publicity.176 Courts should balance the degree
to which protection of the right of publicity will protect the economic
incentive of the claimant to develop their skill against the degree to

174. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2013).
175. See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
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which the public will be deprived of the expression that is at issue. 177
Although balancing tests will always leave some opening for
ambiguity and interpretation, this test will create greater
predictability through more transparent analysis. Courts will need to
reason through why the decision in a right of publicity case promotes
the First Amendment values. This will protect the marketplace of
ideas and lead to more coherent and reliable outcomes for parties.
Although Hart and In re NCAA applied the right of publicity
doctrine to the emerging medium of video games, in cases with very
sympathetic plaintiffs, these issues merely serve to cloud the right of
publicity analysis. The Transformative Use Test and the other
existing tests fail to properly weigh the interests identified in
Zacchini and in doing so, fail to protect core First Amendment
expression. The right of publicity is, at root, an attempt to protect the
marketplace of ideas. By applying this two-tiered test, courts can
enforce right of publicity claims more predictably and with greater
respect for the First Amendment values recognized by the Supreme
Court.

177. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.

